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dustry as a determinant of business velocity. However, these differ-
ences among size classes exist even within particular industries, as
Table A-12 indicates.24 Within each of four industries, smaller firms
have tended to maintain higher velocities than larger firms. This
finding strongly supports the view that the velocity differences
shown in Chart 6 for all non-financial corporations are genuinely
the result of firm size and not merely a reflection of varying indus-
trial composition among size classes. In chemicals and motor vehi-
cles (Table A-12) velocity behaved much the same as for all non-
financial corporations; in particular, it rose more in the largest size
class than in any other, and most markedly since 1950. Transpor-
tation and retail food trade, however, provide contrasts to the gen-
eral pattern. In the former the sharpest velocity rises occurred in
the intermediate classes; only moderate rises in the largest classes,
and little change since 1948 in the smallest classes. Retail food trade
velocity declined in all size classes during 1950—55—somewhat more
for large, than for small, firms.
At the end of 1957, firms in the largest size class held about one-
third of all non-financial corporate cash (Table A-il). This pro-
portion has grown slowly since 1946, exerting moderate downward
pressure on aggregate corporate velocity. However, there were de-
clines in the shares of the $5,000,000—$l0,000,000 and $10,000,-
000—$30,000,00o groups. As a result, the net impact of weight shifts
on the trend of corporate velocity has been very minor: the aggre-
gate figure is virtually the same whether 1946 or 1957 weights are
applied to the 1957 size-class velocities.
IV. WHY VELOCITIES DIFFER AT ANY POINT IN TIME
In Section III we noted persistent differences in velocity from
sector to sector, those among corporate size classes being particu-
larly striking. There appear to be several reasons for these differ-
ences.
DIFFERENCES AMONG CORPORATE SIZE CLASSES
1. Inadequate velocity measures.—Our measures of corporate ve-
locity include neither capital expenditures nor financial payments.
Both give rise to a demand for money, and their omission results in
an understatement of corporate velocity. Insofar as large firms en-
24. The industries included in these tables are chemicals, motor vehicles, transporta-
tion, and retail food trade. They were selected for their quantitative importance, ade-
quacy of representation in all size classes, and absence of major reclassifications during
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gage in these types of payments more than small firms, the true re-
lation between small- and large-firm velocities is obscured. While
such is undoubtedly the case, it is difficult to judge its importance.
We do know, as was already mentioned, that aggregate corporate ye-
locities from Flow-of-Funds, which include capital outlays, closely
resemble those from Statistics of Income. This suggests that size-
class differentials are not greatly influenced by the omission of these
expenditures.
Velocity differences among size classes are understated, though
not appreciably, by a further statistical shortcoming. Our measures
fail to exclude depreciation, amortization, and depletion allowances
from the velocity numerator, even though they are not cash outlays.
In recent years these items have been larger in relation to total costs
for large firms than for small firms.25 Even for large firms, however,
they are a minor part of total costs.
Perhaps the major statistical distortion of our size-class velocities
results from the common practice of "window-dressing" financial
statements. It may well be that large corporations, nearly all of
whom publish annual reports and conduct their affairs under close
public scrutiny, indulge in this practice to a greater extent than do
smaller firms. Since one goal of window-dressing is to exaggerate
corporate liquidity, the effect clearly is to lower velocity, as com-
puted from end-of-year cash. There seems to be rfb feasible way of
eliminating this distortion from our data. However, it is interesting
to note that quarterly size-class velocities for manufacturing cor-
porations, computed from the FTC-SEC reports, reveal virtually
the same differentials in the first three quarters of the year as in the
final quarter. Presumably window-dressing is most important in
end-of-year data.
2. Analysis of velocity components.—Velocity, which is the ratio
of spending to cash, can be expressed as the product of two com-
ponent ratios: spending to total assets and total assets to cash. Ta-
ble 2 presents these component ratios for all ten size classes in two
postwar years, 1947 and 1957. Taken at face value, the pattern of
variability depicted in this table is highly interesting. As firm size
grows, cash becomes a lesser part of total assets; at the same time,
the ratio of spending to assets falls even more sharply. Thus the
tendency for large firms to maintain relatively low velocities appears
to result solely from iow ratios of spending to assets in general—
25. Based on figures from the Federal Trade Commission—Securities and Exchange
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i.e., from their relatively heavy use of capital in the production
process.
Unfortunately, the data in Table 2 are influenced in some degree
by a "regression effect." Inasmuch as the basis of classification of
firms is size of total assets, one would expect ratios with total assets
as a component to vary with size merely because of random varia-
tions in these assets. At any time, assets of some firms will be ab-
normally high or low; assuming that cash is not similarly affected,
the ratio of assets to cash will therefore be abnormally high or low.
TABLE 2
VELOCITIES AND VELOCITY COMPONENTS FOR ALL NON-FINANCIAL
CORPORATIONS, BY SIZE CLASSES, 1947 AND 1957
1947 1957
SIZE
Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of
Velocity Spending Assets Velocity Spending Assets
to Assets to Cash to Assets to Cash
1 20.05 3.351 5.985 26.12 3.512 7.438
2 19.33 2.888 6.695 24.34 2.806 8.675
3 19.55 2.748 7.115 25.12 2.681 9.370
4 19.39 2.566 7.556 25.97 2.606 9.965
5 18.76 2.393 7.840 24.13 2.422 9.962
6 16.92 2.010 8.417 21.60 2.053 10.521
7 14.90 1.678 8,878 19.06 1711 11.135
8 14.29 1.445 9.886 18.14 1.431 12.674
9 13.14 1.167 11.262 20.86 1.383 15.090
10 13.22 0.833 15.861 23.19 '0.932 24.889
* Seenote to Chart 6 for identity of size classes.
Small size classes are likely to include more firms with abnormally
low than abnormally high assets; hence ratios of assets to cash
will tend to be understated for small firms, while the opposite bias
exists for large firms. In addition, the bias works in the opposite
direction for ratios of spending to assets.
This objection is technically correct, but its importance is doubt-
ful. Random variability in asset size would have to be very sub-
stantial to explain the differences revealed in Table 2. Furthermore,
these differences make sense in terms of conventional monetary
theory. The declining ratio of cash to assets as firm size increases is
explained to a large extent by the rising ratio of government securi-
ties holdings to assets and to cash (Table 3). In other words, large
firms tend to substitute government securities for cash much morePostwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 505
than do small firms.2° The ratio of assets to cash plus government
securities is much less a function of firm size than is the ratio of
assets to cash alone. Possibly the ratio of assets to all liquid assets,
including commercial paper and a few other items as well as govern-
ment securities, would show no relation to firm size whatever. The
declining ratio of spending to assets as firm size increases can also
be readily explained, as we shall see below.
3. The influence of deficit firms.—One reason for the lower veloci-
ty ratios of large firms is that firms without net income hold a larger
TABLE 3
share of cash in small size classes than in large classes. In general,
small firms with no net income tend to have higher velocity ratios
than do small firms with net income.27 Table 4 illustrates these rela-
tionships for 1946 and 1957. In the former year, 19 per cent of the
velocity difference between the smallest and largest size classes dis-
appears when firms without net income are excluded from the com-
putations. In 1939 the same statistic was 21 per cent. Because of
26. The concept of money substitutes, which has been emphasized so much in recent
monetary literature, contributes little, if anything, to the analysis of size-class velocity
differences. From Table 3 it can be seen that ratios of corporate spending to holdings of
cash plus government securities differ much more between large and small firms than do
ratios of spending to cash alone (i.e., velocity).
27. Moreover, in the early years covered by this study the opposite tended to be true
of large firms. See Table 4, 1946, for an example.
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* See footnote to Chart6 for identity of size classes.506 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
the substantial convergence of small- and large-firm velocities in the
postwar period, the importance of deficit firms had become even
greater by 1957: for firms with net income in that year, velocity
was higher in the largest class than in any of the three smallest
classes—a sharp contrast with the figures based on all firms.
4. The cost of holding money.—Apparently the major explanation
of size-class differences in spending-asset ratios and therefore in
velocity ratios is that the cost of holding money is much less for
TABLE 4
CORPORATESIZE-CLASS VELOCITIES FOR ALL FIRMS AND FIRMS WITH
NET INCOME AND PER CENT OF SIZE-CLASS MONEY HELD BY FIRMS
WITH NET INCOME, SELECTED SIZE CLASSES, 1946AND1957
PerCent Velocity, Velocity, . . ofMoney,
SIZE CLASSES* . Firmswith All Firms F irms with Net Income Net Income
A. 1946
1 17.34 16.26 82.1
2 17.09 16.67 91.1
3 17.60 17.31 93.7
9 11.28 11.57 89.1
10 10.60 10.81 85.3
Aggregate,allclasses.. — 13.73 —13.84__——_90.2
B. 1957
1 26.12 22.16 74.0
2 24.34 21.21 88.1
3 25.12 22.76 92.6
9 20.86 20.67 93.7
10 23,19 23.03 93.0
Aggregate, all classes. 22.34 —21 .44 89.9
*Seenoteto Chart 6 for identity of size classes.
large firms than for small firms. This cost is a complex variable.2S
From one point of view it is the foregone yield that could be earned
on securities; in this sense the cost of holding money is more or less
the same regardless of firm size. It is also measured by the internal
rate of return on capital to the firm and by the cost of borrowed
funds, which would be the same as the rate of return in equilibrium.
For a variety of reasons the cost of funds is much higher for small
28. I have discussed some aspects of the cost of holding money at greater length in
"Monetary Velocity in the United States," in Studies in the Quantity Theory of Money,
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firms29 Table S contains a rough indication of this fact:the ratio of
interest payments to interest-bearing debt, computed from Statistics
of Income, was decidedly lower for large firms in each of the four
years shown. It is clear that small firms have a strong incentive to
substitute labor for relatively expensive capital. The result is larger
current spending in relation to total assets and therefore to cash.
Perhaps the principal respect in which funds are more- costly for
small firms is related to their greater reliance on trade credit. Table
6 illustrates this strikingly for 1939, 1943,1946, and 1957. Without
exception, the ratio of accounts payable to total assets falls as firm
size increases.30 An even stronger decline shows up in the ratio
payables to long-term debt
TABLE .5
of
RATIOS OF INTEREST PAID TO INTEREST-BEARING DEBT, NON-
FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS WITH NET IN COME,
BY SIZE CLASSES, SELECTED YEARS
* Seenote to Chart 6 for identity of size classes.
For some users, trade credit is mainly a convenience that arises
as part of normal business routines; forothers, particularly small
firms, it is viewed explicitly as a source of funds. Trade credit is not
costless to the user, of course. For example, terms of "2/10 net 30"
imply an annual interest charge of 36 per cent if the account is paid
in 30 days. Butsmall firms often have no better source of funds.
29. One of the largest and most recent bodies of evidence supporting this contention
is contained in U.S. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financing Small
Business, Parts 1 and 2 (Report to the Committees on Banking and Currency and the
Select Committees on Small Business, April ii, 1958). See particularly the chapters
prepared by James B. Eckert, "Member Bank Lending to Small Business, 1955—57," pp.
371—95, and Geoffrey H. Moore, Thomas R. Atkinson, and Edward J. Kilberg, "Risks
and Returns in Small Business Financing," pp. 40—106.
30. In part, these results may reflect a regression effect of the sort discussed above.
However, the fact that the ratio of payables to long-term debt behaves in similar fashion
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Long-term debt may be even more expensive or totally unavailable;
Table 6 demonstrates that such debt is of minor importance for
small firms, in contrast to large firms. Bank credit, though used
heavily by small firms, is subject to clo.se rationing by bankers
through both price and non-price mechanisms. Because of these
facts, the typical small firm manages its cash on a hand-to-mouth
basis.
There is a final instance in which the cost of holding money may
be a determinant of corporate velocity. Earlier it was noted that
small firms without net income have higher velocities than profitable
TABLE 6
RATIOS OF ACCOUNTS PAYABLE TO ASSETS AND LONG-TERM DEBT, NON-FINAN-
CIAL FIRMS WITH NET INCOME,SIZE CLASSES, SELECTED YEARS
RATIOS OF ACCOUNTS PAYABLE RATIOS or ACCOU'NTS PAYABLE
TO ASSETS TO LONG-TERM DEBT
SiZE
CLASSES*
1939 1943 1946 1957 1939 1943 1946 1957
1 0.2240.1820.1950.1953.12 2.55 3.19 2.09
2 .184 .144 .177 .1782.47 2.19 2.74 1.82
3 .158 .126 .171 .1722.01 1.95 2.46 1.86
4 .127 .114 .159 .1711.63 1.84 2,28 1.86
S .118 .106 .142 .1561.39 1.58 2.00 1.82
6 .097 .096 .122 .132 1.03 1.30 1.59 1.58
7 .081 .084 .102 .1110.73 0.96 1.12 1.01
8 .066 .080 .087 .0830.41 0.73 0.72 0.65
9 .051 .072 .076 .0810.21 0.38 0.45 0.47
10 0.0490.0660.0610.0610.22 0.29 0.30 0.25
See note to Chart 6 for identity of size classes.
small firms. It seems likely that these velocity differences result
mainly from differences in the cost of holding money. In general,
unprofitable firms have higher interest costs and rely heavily on
costly trade credit. Cash balances are real luxuries for such firms,
and their velocities are therefore high.
5. Compensating balance requirements.—At least one investiga-
tor, George Garvy, has held that compensating balance requirements
tend to reduce velocity; in fact, Garvy argues that the increased
prevalence of these requirements "is an important and perhaps even
one of the major reasons why the transactions velocity of demand
deposits in the fifties is considerably lower than in the twenties."31
Inasmuch as compensating balances are required more commonly
31. George Garvy, Deposit Velocity and Its Significance (New York, 1959), p. 32.Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 509
of larger borrowers and by large banks,32 Garvy's hypothesis, if
correct, might help explain velocity differences among corporate size
classes.
The corporate velocity pattern we have observed certainly is con-
sistent with Garvy's hypothesis. Nevertheless, I am not persuaded
that the differential incidence of compensating balance requirements
has any substantial impact on business velocity; nor do I believe
that velocity trends or differences in levels over time can be explained
in this manner. On the contrary, one might argue that the main im-
pact of these requirements, insofar as they have any effect at all,
is to make bank services more expensive and thus increase the cost
of holding money. I would expect firms that face burdensome bal-
ance requirements to substitute open-market borrowing or non-bank
private placements for bank loans, so that spending per dollar of
deposits would rise, not fall. Whether, in fact, such substitutions are
actually made is a question for further investigation. However, it is
significant that, during the postwar period, deposit turnover has
risen substantially more in large cities, where balances are more
commonly required, than in other centers and that corporate velocity
has risen much more among large firms than among small firms.
INDUSTRY DIFFERENCES
The preceding explanation of velocity differences among size
classes appears to be adequate for a given industry. However, the
size-class differences shown in Chart 6 relate to all non-financial
corporations. In some degree they reflect industry differences in
velocity among firms of any size class, combined with non-propor-
tional representation of all industries in each class.33 By the same
token, the industry differences shown in Charts 4, 5A, and 5B reflect,
to some extent, differences in the size structure of the various
industries.
A rough idea of the importance of differential size structure as a
source of velocity differences among industries can be gained by
comparing velocity with distribution of cash among size classes for
several industries. Table 7 does this for major industry divisions in
1947. In the trade division, which had the highest velocity, firms
with $50,000,000 or more total assets accounted for only 13.0 per
cent of industry cash. Public utility firms, on the other hand, had
32. See "Credit Lines and Minimum Balance Requirements," Federal Reserve Bulletin,
June, 1956.
33. As we have already noted, distortion from this source cannot be great (see Table
A-12).510 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
the next to lowest velocity and the highest per cent of industry cash
held by large firms. Aside from these two cases, however, the rela-
tionship is weak. It does not appear that differential size structure is
an important reason for industry differences in velocity.
In order to avoid differential size structure and profitability as a
source of velocity variations by industry, I have computed velocity
and component ratios for firms with net incomes in the $1- to $5-
million size class, by major industry divisions for the year 1947
(Table 8). The variation in velocities is substantial—nearly the
same as that for all firms shown in Table 7. the ratios
of assets to cash are all within the narrow limits of 7.8—8.5, except
TABLE 7
RELATIONBETWEEN VELOCITY AND DISTRIBUTION OF































for the agriculture, forestry, and fishery industries. It is variations
in the ratio of spending to assets that account for most of the ob-
served differences in velocity. This agrees broadly with the picture
we found above in our treatment of size-class differences.
Another similarity between industrial and size-class variations in
velocity is the apparent relation in both cases to degree of reliance
on trade credit. Table 8 shows two indexes of the importance of
trade credit, again for fairly standardized groups of firms in each
of the seven non-financial industry divisions. The ratio of accounts
payable to assets is correlated loosely with velocity; a stronger rela-
tionship exists between velocity and the ratio of payables to long-
term debt.
At least two interpretations can be placed on these facts. The first
view advanced earlier in connection with our size-class analysis,Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money 511
that heavy use of trade credit implies a high cost of holding money,
undoubtedly has some validity. The other view is that heavy use of
trade credit is associated with a high degree of coincidence between
receipts and expenditures, which, in turn, means high velocity. I
say "associated with" because the line of causality may run in either
direction. In some instances use of trade credit tends to shorten the
payments interval, thereby raising velocity; in others, use of trade
credit is largely symptomatic of a payments interval that is short
because of more basic aspects of production functions. In the latter
case trade credit cannot be regarded as a significant velocity
determinant.
TABLE 8
VELOCITIES,VELOCITY COMPONENTS, AND RATIOS OF ACCOUNTS PAYABLE TO As-
SETS AND TO LONG-TERM DEBT, NON-FINANCIAL CORPORATIONS WITH NET
INCOME AND WITH $1-$5MILLIONTOTAL ASSETS, BY MAJOR INDUSTRY DIvi-
SIONS, 1947
Ratioof Ratio of Ratio of Ratio of Accounts Major Industry . . Accounts Velocity Spending Assets Payable to Division Payable to Assets to Cash Long-Term to Assets Debt
Trade 25.08 3.196 7.848 0.182 3.187
Construction 15.11 1.788 8.449 .170 3.765
Manufacturing 9.85 1.240 7.941 .094 1.766.
Agriculture, etc 9.42 0.702 13.423 .092 0.970
Miningandquarrying.. 9.01 1.068 8,432 .069 0.811
Service 8.33 1.030 8.090 .092 0.398
Public utility 7.04 0.825 8.532 0.101 0.436
Consideringthe general nature of the various industry divisions,
it becomes clear that the second view of trade credit and its relation
to velocity has much merit. Trade, for example, is characterized by
relatively low fixed costs and a high asset-turnover rate; the average
interval between receipts and expenditures would tend to be short,
and velocity would tend to be high, even if short-term debt were
totally absent. To some extent, however, heavy use of trade credit
probably has produced a further shortening of the payments in-
terval. Construction—the other high-velocity industry—appears to
have broadly similar characteristics. The mining and public utility
industries, on the other hand, are clear examples of opposite tenden-
cies: fixed costs are relatively high, and a substantial portion of
outlays consists of lumpy capital expenditures. The same is true of
agriculture and, less obviously, the service industry. Manufacturing512 Postwar Rise in the Velocity of Money
appears to fall in an intermediate category. Thus there seems to be
a strong correlation between industry velocity and degree of coin-
cidence between receipts and expenditures.
Industry differences in velocity probably are caused in part by
factors other than those mentioned above. However, the role of such
factors appears to be minor, and their analysis will not be pursued
here.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CORPORATE AND
NON-CORPORATE SECTORS
We saw in Chart 3 that non-corporate velocity was substantially
lower than corporate velocity throughout 1939—56. One obvious
reason for this persistent difference is the heavy representation of
agriculture in the non-corporate sector. In 1955, for instance, 32.1
per cent of non-corporate cash was held by the farm subsector. Al-
though non-corporate velocity in that year was 12.6, farm velocity
was only 4.7, while velocity of unincorporated businesses was 15.8.
Corporate velocity in 1955 was 18.6; hence about half the differen-
tial between corporate and non-corporate velocities would disap-
pear if agriculture were excluded from the calculations.
On the other hand, the unincorporated and incorporated business
sectors differ in industrial composition. Trading firms, which usually
have high velocity, are much more important in the former sector.
Furthermore, unincorporated firms within any industry are probably
smaller, on the average, than corporations. One would therefore ex-
pect the velocity of unincorporated firms to exceed that of corpora-
tions. Why such is not the case is a problem that cannot be ex-
amined here.
V. WHY VELOCITY HAS RISEN SINCE THE END OF THE WAR
Earlier we considered and rejected two possible explanations of
the postwar velocity rise. In Section II we saw that the similar be-
havior of three aggregate velocity measures since 1946 argues against
hypotheses that imply differential behavior of velocities. In Section
III we saw that the postwar velocity rise cannot be explained by
weight shifts in favor of low-hoarding sectors. Insofar as weight
shifts have had any effect at all, they have been velocity-reducing.
We turn now to other explanations of postwar velocity behavior.
A strong case can be made for the view that much of the postwar
velocity rise has been simply a recovery from abnormally low war-
time values. The important question is how much of the rise has
resulted from war-related factors, how much from more fundamental